Jane's Fighting Ships of World War II

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On 23 June the UK Royal Navy (RN) Type 45 destroyer HMS Defender took a direct route from Odessa in Ukraine to its next sea area off Georgia, entering Russia's declared territorial waters off the Crimean Peninsula. The United Kingdom does not recognise Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and considered itself to be in Ukrainian territorial waters. What Defender actually did – conduct innocent passage – was well within international maritime law. That was not how Russia saw it, however, and its response, according to its own state reports, was to fire warning shots and conduct preventive bombing Dec 21: Russia's Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) are being re-equipped with new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the force's commander, Colonel General Sergey Karakaev, told the Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) military newspaper on 17 December. “We plan to place four regiments on duty in 2022. They include a regiment of the Uzhur missile formation armed with Sarmat missiles, one new regiment of the Yasnensky formation armed with Avangard, and missile regiments in the Tambov and Kirov regions armed with mobile Yars launchers,” he said. The Kozelsk formation will place a silo-based Yars missile system in service, while the Barnaul formation will do so with mobile Yars by the end of 2021, Col Gen Karakaev said. Feb 23: The Russian Navy has moved three large landing ships, five warships, and several vessels of other classes, including one missile boat, to the Sea of Azov under the pretext of participating in exercises, Ukraine's Minister of Defence Oleksii Reznikov stated during a press briefing on 21 February. In video footage posted by Ukrainian media outlet MyKerch on its VKontakte social media account on 21 February, more than 10 Russian Navy warships could be seen headed towards the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait. This included the Ropucha (Project 775)-class landing ships Tsesar Kunikov and Novocherkassk , the Alligator (Project 1171)-class landing ship Saratov , the Bykov (Project 22160)-class corvette Pavel Derzhavin , the Tarantul (Project 12411)-class corvette Neberezhnye Chelny , and the Grisha (Project 1124)-class corvette Eisk.

Nov 29: In a statement released on 12 November, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded to the 23 October visit of the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen-class frigate HNoMS Thor Heyerdahl to the port of Longyearbyen, a Norwegian outpost in Svalbard. Zakharova said that the visit “implies the use of the archipelago's infrastructure in the military planning of the defence of Norway, including the reception of reinforcement from NATO allies.” Norway has sovereignty over the archipelago and consequently the Svalbard Treaty does not prohibit a Norwegian military presence unless a deployment is offensive in nature.Oct 7: During The Russian military announced on 29 September that its forces had completed their withdrawal from Belarus that day, following the conclusion of ‘Zapad-2021' strategic exercises on 17 September. The scenario for Zapad-2021 was similar to that of its predecessor in 2017: an alliance of NATO countries conducting a limited invasion of Belarus following a period of political instability instigated by Western forces. For the purposes of the exercise, all parties were given pseudonyms; Belarus became ‘Polesei', Russia ‘the Central Federation', and their alliance ‘the Northern Coalition'. The NATO countries, ‘Nyaris' (Lithuania), Pomorie (Poland), and ‘the Polar Republic' (parts of Latvia and components of NATO partner forces in Poland), represent a belief or hope within the Russian military that a conflict with NATO would initially be limited in scope, enabling the Russian armed forces and Kremlin to manage escalation and limit its horizontal growth. This belief in turn determines the forces and means committed to the fight, with the intention of using only the forces needed to achieve the desired goals of protecting Belarus and forcing peace with NATO before the conflict escalates beyond control. Apr 4: Russia's Russia has lost its first Sukhoi Su-35 ‘Flanker-E' multirole fighter on combat operations over Ukraine, imagery posted online on 3 April reveal. The premier operational combat aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) reportedly came down in the Kharkiv region of eastern Ukraine, near the town of Izyum. Although no information relating to how the aircraft came down has been revealed, the imagery released shows it to have come to rest largely intact, before being consumed by fire. The aircraft is identifiable as being an Su-35 by it being a single-seat ‘Flanker' variant without canards, and equipped with the combination missile rails and wingtip-mounted electronic countermeasures systems in place of the missile rails of the baseline Su-27/30 versions. The Autumn conscription period began on 05 October and will run until 31 December. Some 127,000 civilians will be conscripted from across Russia, with the majority of conscripts expected to be deployed the Central, Western, and Southern Military Districts.

Oct 14: The first S-500 55R6M Prometey (Prometheus) strategic air-defence system has entered service with a unit in the Moscow region, the TASS news agency reported on 13 October, citing a source close to the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD). The first regimental set is to be followed by a second in the first half of 2022, the source added. No official announcement has been made by the MoD, but Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov told the RIA Novosti news agency in September that deliveries were under way to Russian forces. These initial S-500 units may be intended primarily for training purposes or limited service, as the Izvestia newspaper reported on 12 October that Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov has said serial production and deliveries of the S-500 are scheduled for 2025.

Domestic Affairs:

Oct: The Russian Central Military District's (CMD's) 41st Combined Arms Army has begun withdrawing equipment from the Pogonovo training ground south of Voronezh city and loading it on to trains at Maslovka railway station. Video and imagery sourced from social media and analysed by Janes has revealed the loading of large quantities of equipment at Maslovka railway station, including 2S19 self-propelled guns, T-72BM and T-72B1 main battle tanks, and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. Janes has also been able to confirm that equipment belonging to the 41st Combined Arms Army's 35th Motorised Brigade has been loaded on to trains at Maslovka.

Aug:The Kazakhstan Air Defence Forces (KADF) will receive four Sukhoi Su-30SM ‘Flanker-H' multirolefighter aircraft from Russia by the end of 2022, the Director of Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, Dmitry Shugayev, was quoted by Russia's TASS news agency as saying on 25August. Shugayev noted that 20 Su-30SMs have been delivered to the KADF so far, adding that thelatest batch of aircraft to be delivered next year is part of an ongoing contract. Janes understands thatthese four aircraft will complete the KADF's second squadron of 12 Su-30SMs. The Kazakh governmentfirst expressed its intention to buy a second squadron of Su-30SMs in August 2017 as part of aframework agreement signed with Russia. The 43rd Missile Ship Division’s Admiral Gorshkov Class frigate ADMIRAL GORSHKOV (pen. 461) has conducted two live fire Tsirkon missile tests in the White Sea. Already a Janes customer? Read more here. Russia's Sarmat super-heavy ICBM undergoes first full flight test Oct 28: The Russian Central Military District's (CMD's) 41st Combined Arms Army has begun withdrawing equipment from the Pogonovo training ground south of Voronezh city and loading it on to trains at Maslovka railway station. Video and imagery sourced from social media and analysed by Janes has revealed the loading of large quantities of equipment at Maslovka railway station, including 2S19 self-propelled guns, T-72BM and T-72B1 main battle tanks, and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. Janes has also been able to confirm that equipment belonging to the 41st Combined Arms Army's 35th Motorised Brigade has been loaded on to trains at Maslovka.Aug:‘Zapad-2021' (‘West-2021') is set to be larger in scale and ambition than the 2017 iteration of theexercise and will serve to indicate Russian support for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenkowhile exploring the capabilities of the modernised Russian armed forces. One aspect of the exercisethis year that will certainly be different from 2017 is the level of Belarusian involvement. In 2017Lukashenko was ostensibly reserved in his public attitude towards a Russian troop presence in Belarus.Indeed, during 2014–20 Belarus sought to balance its relations between the West and Russia, outwardlyleaning neither way and currying favour with both when possible. Domestic Affairs Doctrine, tactics, and technical issues underpin Russian forces' communications woes