Frank dismisses this statement by arguing that the emperor’s decision to surrender was made even before the accurate assessment of the Manchurian situation reached Tokyo.[51] This is hardly a convincing argument. The effect of the Soviet entry had little relation to the military situation in Manchuria. The very fact that the USSR had entered the war shattered Japan’s last hope for ending it through Soviet mediation. In other words, the political consequence of the Soviet action, not the military situation in Manchuria, was the crucial factor. His work mainly focused on erotic paintings of men, including elements from a wide variety of kinks. Hasegawa was mainly published in queer publications and soon garnered a reputation for his skill and ability to mesh so many different cultures and practices within his paintings. However, while he could gain a level of success within Japan, he adamantly refused all offers to distribute his work internationally.

Today, Hasegawa holds a distinguished position as a forerunner of homoerotic art within Japan, championing one of few non-European perspectives in the modern genre. Bungaku Itō, the visionary founder of Japan’s first gay magazine, Barazoku, hailed Hasegawa’s art as transcending the realm of pornography, evoking the essence of Buddhist artistry. Nevertheless, Hasegawa’s artistic creations have remained relatively concealed. However, a compilation of his magazine works titled Sadao Hasegawa: Paintings and Drawings emerged from the British publisher Gay Men’s Press in 1990. A more comprehensive monograph, Paradise Visions, saw the light of day in 1996 through Kochi Studio’s domestic publication in Japan. And more recently, in 2022, Baron Books, the cult UK-based publisher, unveiled an inaugural posthumous monograph, delving into Hasegawa’s seldom-seen archives. It is beautiful; it is fine; it is the noblest form of affection. There is nothing unnatural about it. It is intellectual, and it repeatedly exists between an older and a younger man, when the older man has intellect, and the younger man has all the joy, hope and glamour of life before him. That it should be so, the world does not understand.” On August 8, one day before the Soviet invasion, the General Staff’s Bureau of Military Affairs produced a study outlining what Japan should do if the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum demanding Japan’s total withdrawal from the Asian continent. According to this plan, the following alternatives were suggested: (1) reject the Soviet demand and carry out the war against the Soviet Union in addition to the United States and Britain; (2) conclude peace with the United States and Britain immediately and concentrate on the war against the Soviet Union; (3) accept the Soviet demand and seek Moscow’s neutrality, while carrying on the war against the United States and Britain; and (4) accept the Soviet demand and involve the Soviet Union in the Greater East Asian War. Of these alternatives, the army preferred to accept the Soviet demand and either keep the Soviet Union neutral or, if possible, involve the Soviet Union in the war against the United States and Britain.[40] The complicated political calculations of the Japanese leadership were closely intermingled with crucial psychological factors. In particular, there were two different psychological elements at work. The first was the reversal of the degree of hatred attached to two enemies, as described above. The second was a profound sense of betrayal. Some of the most well-known cultures that accepted relationships between men accepted them only under the condition that there was a significant age gap. Informed by the sexist power dynamics enforced in heterosexual relationships, the belief often was that a romantic relationship required a power imbalance. This power imbalance often came in the form of age gaps and class differences. In addition, they were enforced by assigned sexual roles for the parties within the relationships.

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As I have argued above, Japan relied on Soviet neutrality both militarily and diplomatically. Diplomatically, Japan pinned its last hope on Moscow’s mediation for the termination of the war. Only by Soviet entry into the war was Japan forced to make a decision on the Potsdam terms. Militarily as well, Japan’s Ketsu Go strategy was predicated on Soviet neutrality. That was why the General Staff’s Bureau of Military Affairs constantly overruled the Fifth Department’s alarming warnings that a Soviet invasion might be imminent. Manchuria was not written off, as Frank asserts; rather, the military was confident that it could keep the USSR neutral, at least for a while. When the Soviet invasion of Manchuria occurred, the military was taken completely by surprise. Even Asada admits, “[T]he Soviet entry spelled the strategic bankruptcy of Japan.”[98] Despite the repeated bravado calling for the continuation of the war, it pulled the rug right out from underneath the Japanese military, puncturing a gaping hole in their strategic plan. Their insistence on the continuation of the war lost its rationale. a b Naruyama, Akimitsu (January 14, 2015). "Sadao Hasegawa". Gadabout Magazine . Retrieved November 20, 2018. Kristian F. Power, Sadao Hasegawa gallery 1. (n.d.). Retrieved July 28, 2021, from http://www.kristianfpower.com/HSG/index.html

Two documents issued by the cabinet need to be examined. The first is a cabinet statement released after the imperial rescript was broadcast, which refers to both the use of the atomic bomb, which changed the nature of war, and the Soviet entry as two important reasons for ending the war.[90] The second is the prime minister’s radio announcement of August 15, in which he stated that Soviet entry into the war had prompted the cabinet to make the final decision to end the war, and that the atomic bomb, which “it was evident the enemy will continue to use,” would destroy both the military power of the empire “and the foundation of the existence of the nation, endangering the basis of our kokutai.”[91] Both documents cite the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war as the two important reasons that had prompted the government to seek the termination of the war, thus invalidating Frank’s claim that the atomic bomb had a more decisive effect on the emperor’s decision to end the war. Born in the Tōkai region of Japan, Sadao Hasegawa was a Japanese graphic artist known for creating homoerotic fetish art. His first solo exhibition, “Sadao Hasegawa’s Alchemism: Meditation for 1973” was held in Tokyo, Japan, and featured collages, sculptures, and oil paintings. In 1978 Hasegawa’s art was published for the first time in “Barazoku”, a monthly magazine for gay men. Later he would be published inthe magazines “Sabu”, “Samson” and Adon”. Europe, Hasegawa's works have not been done justice here in his home country. With great influences from Baron is pleased to present the first posthumous book by Japanese artist Sadao Hasegawa (Jan 1945- Nov 1999), dedicated to Hasegawa’s rarely-published archive.Maj. Gen. Amano Masakazu, Historical Manuscript File; also see Amano Masakazu Chinjutsusho, GHQ Senshika, vol. 6, Chuo Shusen shori 228, Boei Kenkyujo Senshishitsu. The English translation of the Historical Manuscript File is modified in view of the original Japanese testimony in the Boei kenkyujo. The book also includes an essay by Dr Thomas Baudinette, author of Regimes of Desire: Young Men, Media and Masculinity in Tokyo (University of Michigan Press, 2021) and is designed by Sam Boxer, Art Director of Gut Magazine. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the Nagasaki bomb and, for that matter, the two bombs combined, did not have a decisive influence on Japan’s decision to surrender. Remove the Nagasaki bomb, and Japan’s decision would have been the same.

a b c d Naruyama, Akimitsu (1 December 2008). "HASEGAWA SADAO". #205 Matsuoka Kudan Bldg. 2-2-8 Kudan Minami, Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 102-0074 Japan. Naruyama Gallery . Retrieved 25 February 2013. And while we’re on the subject of Bond design, Daniel Kleinman’s superb Casino Royale title sequence is on YouTube.Edo-Period Shungas (erotic art), his obsession and display of beauty in the male body and sex combined with Before the Hiroshima bombing, Togo had already become convinced that sooner or later, Japan would have to accept the Potsdam terms. It is possible that the Hiroshima bomb further reinforced his conviction. But it bears repeating that he did not take the initiative to reverse the previous course, and that he did not propose direct negotiations with the United States and Britain. As for the emperor, it is possible that the Hiroshima bomb contributed to his urgent desire to terminate the war, but it is erroneous to say that immediately after the Hiroshima bomb, Hirohito decided to accept the Potsdam terms, as Asada asserts.

Kawabe Torashiro, Nov. 21, 1949, 5–6, Historical Manuscript File, Center for Military History [hereafter CMH]. I thank Richard Frank for allowing me to use his collection from the Center for Military History. Gikai toben shiryo,’ Kokubo taiko kankei juyoimanaka shorui tsuzuki, Rikugunsho Gunjika, Rikugun Chusa Shigero shokan, Chuo, Sensoshido sonota 78, Boeikenkyujo Senshishitsu.Hasegawa was born in 1945 in the Tokai region of Japan. In his twenties, he traveled to India and began to take up drawing. His first solo exhibition, "Sadao Hasegawa's Alchemism: Meditation for 1973" was held in 1973 in Tokyo, Japan, and featured oil paintings, collages, and sculptures. In 1978, Hasegawa's art was published for the first time in Barazoku, a monthly magazine for gay men; he would later go on to be published in Sabu [ja], Samson, and Adon [ja]. Hasegawa cited Go Mishima and Tom of Finland among his influences, calling the former "a master illustrator of the male physique" in an obituary written in 1989 for Barazoku. His early works, directly inspired by Tom of Finland, reflected European art styles. Beginning in the late 1980s, Hasegawa began making regular trips to Bali and Thailand, resulting in a greater focus on Asian iconography and mythology in his art. Frank, Downfall, 271. Frank’s source is Asada’s article. Frank also cites Robert J. C. Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 152–53, but Butow has nothing to say about the August 7 cabinet meeting. Frank explains that Asada’s source is Togo Shigenori, Jidai no ichimen (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1952; reprint, Hara shobo, 1989), but Togo’s memoirs are silent about the Potsdam Proclamation. Kawabe’s diary entry for the evening of August 9 also indicates his psychological condition. Unable to sleep because of mosquitoes and Tokyo’s tropical heat, he mused on the fate of the country: “To continue fighting will mean death, but to make peace with the enemy will mean ruin. But we have no choice but to seek life in death with the determination to have the entire Japanese people perish with the homeland as their deathbed pillow by continuing to fight, thereby keeping the pride of the Yamato race forever.”[48] a b c d e f Adonna, Steve (Summer 2000). "Impressions of Sadao Hasegawa". The Tom of Finland Foundation . Retrieved November 20, 2018.